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Abstract 
This paper studied the behavior of management toward the implementation of Good Corporate 
Governance in Indonesia to determine whether it has any influence towards profitability and its 
implication to the Manufacturing Firms’ value publicly listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange. There were 
41 corporations who met the criteria of the survey. The data were analyzed using Panel Regression 
with fixed effects Model. The empirical findings show that the implementation of Corporate 
Governance in Indonesia  has a positive, significant and direct impact toward firms’ profitability and 
firms’ value. Corporate Governance principles based on OECD principles that have positive and 
significant impact to both profitability and Firms’ Valueis Rights of Shareholders, Role of Stakeholders, 
Responsibilities of the Board Commissioners and Board of Directors. The principles that have 
significance and negative impact towards corporate profitability and value, are:  Equitable treatment of 
shareholders and Disclosure and Transparencies.  The most significant principle influencing profitability 
and firms’ value is Disclosure and Transparencies. Profitability plays a greater role in influencing 
Manufacturing Firms’ value in Indonesia. 
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Abstrak 
Penelitian ini pada dasarnya mempelajari perilaku pemimpin perusahaan manufaktur dalam 
implementasi Tata Kelola Perusahaan di Indonesia untuk mengetahui dampaknya terhadap 
keuntungan dan nilai pasar dari perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Terdapat 41 
perusahaan yang memenuhi kriteria dalam penelitian ini. Data akan dianalisis menggunakan 
regresi panel dengan model efek tetap. Hasil penelitian empris ini menyimpulkan bahwa 
implementasi Tata Kelola Perusahaan di Indonesia mempunyai dampak yang positif dan 
signifikan terhadap keuntungan perusahaan dan nilai pasar perusahaan.  Prinsip tata kelola 
perusahaan yang memiliki dampak signifikan dan positif terhadap keuntungan dan nilai 
perusahaan adalah hak Pemegang Saham, Peranan para pemangku kepentingan.  Prinsip yang 
mempengaruhi secara negatif dan signifikan adalah: Perlakuan yang sama kepada Pemegang 
Saham, Keterbukaan dan Transparansi.  Dari riset ini juga ditemukan prinsip OECD yang paling 
menentukan keuntungan perusahaan dan nilai perusahaan adalah Keterbukaan dan 
Transparansi. Profitabilitas memiliki peranan lebih penting dalam mempengaruhi nilai 
perusahaan manufaktur di Indonesia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One major factor for Indonesian companies vulnerable to the negative impact 
of financial crisis in 1997 was the weakness of internal mechanisms of corporate 
governance. Similar to the experience of other corporate entities in the region, the 
failure of Indonesian companies to implement corporate governance practices carefully 
in the management of their companies are associated with a number of factors, 
including high concentration of corporate ownership and lack of transparency in the 
procedures for the acquisition of the company and controls. In addition to problems of 
inefficiency, Indonesian corporate sector is also vulnerable to the problem of risk 
exposure associated with more dependence on external funding, especially when there 
is effective oversight by the Board of Commissioners in Indonesia and inadequate 
monitoring by creditors (Asian Development Bank 1999).  
Since the financial crises in various countries between 1997-1998 that preceded 
the crisis in Thailand (1997), followed by other countries, such as Japan, South Korea, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Singapore, which eventually turned into the Asian 
financial crisis, were results of poor Corporate Governance(CG) in Asian countries. 
The failure of some companies and the emergence of financial malpractices that 
occurred due to crisis is the worst evidence of the weak practice of GCG among 
countries. According to Pangestu and Hariyanto (Suprayitno et al. 2004), 
characteristics of weak practices of GCG in Southeast Asian countries, including 
Indonesia, are (1) the concentration of insider ownership and the power of 
shareholders (including the government and related parties of the center of power), 
(2) weak governance in financial sector, and (3) the ineffectiveness of internal 
regulations and the lack of legal protection for minority shareholders to deal with 
major shareholders and managers.  
According to a research conducted by Black, et.al (2003), there is a strong and 
robust relationship between the implementation of GCG with the profitability of 
companies in South Korea and Russia (Black, 2001). These findings highlight that 
companies with GCG will perform better both financially and in market value. There is 
a need to perform a similar research in Indonesia to find out whether the result would 
be consistent with other parts of the world.Previous researches studied the 
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relationship of Corporate Governance Index with Firm Value using linear regression.  
This research will explore the relationship between Corporate Governance Index, its 
OECD principles and Profitability in terms of Return of Assets using multiple 
regressions, and the scoring is from an external point of view to reduce biasness. 
Based on the description above, this study will construct a Corporate 
Governance Index based on OECD principles adjusted with basic Indonesian 
corporate characteristics. The five parts of Corporate Governance Index will include 
Rights of Shareholders, Equitable Treatment of Shareholders, the Role of Stakeholders 
in Corporate Governance, Disclosure and Transparency, and Responsibilities of the 
Board. The Corporate Governance Index will be compared with the firms’ financial 
performance and market value. Therefore, this study will answer the following 
problems, they are: first, Do investors value the implementation Corporate 
Governance using OECD principles be significant in Indonesia in determining 
profitability and firms’ value?Second, What are the most important OECD principles 
influencing profitability and firms’ value in Indonesia? 
 
METHODS 
This study use a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods of 
hypothesis testing data influencing corporate governance elements of the Return on 
Assets (ROA) and Tobins Q on the 100 Companies listed in Kompas 100 between 
2007-2011, excluding the banking and financial institutions which is the majority of the 
transactions and market capitalization in Indonesia. Qualitative methods were used to 
analyze the primary data of independent variables (exogenous) consisting of elements 
of Corporate Governance Transparency, they are: rights of shareholders, equitable 
treatment of shareholders, role of stakeholders in corporate governance, disclosure 
and transparency, responsibilities of the board.   These data were obtained by way of 
survey questionnaires filled by 2 people analyzing the contents of annual report 2007-
2011 obtained from Bursa Efek Indonesia (Indonesian Stock Exchange), relevant 
corporate websites and news from Kontan.co.id.  While the quantitative methods used 
to analyze secondary data dependent variables (endogenous) are Return on Assets 
(ROA)and Tobins’ Q. This research will be using data panel to compute all the data 
obtained and will be using E Views as a computer software tool to organize the data. 
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The observation of data was conducted 5 times by 5 different individuals to 
minimize biasness and error.  The qualifications of those collecting the data were final 
year students of Accounting major students of undergraduate students and post 
graduate students, to verify the data using the questionnaire built using the OECD 
standard of Good Corporate Governance. 
The choice of research sample was to use purposive sampling method, which is 
to use certain criteria in the sample selection, the criteria of sampling choice in this 
research is: First, Listed in Indeks Kompas 100 in December 2013. Second, the chosen 
companies have complete annual reports and other supporting documents available for public 
access that can be used for the purpose of this research.  
The questionnaire to acquire Corporate Governance Index based on the 5 
OECD principles are: First, variables include Rights of shareholders (15 questions) –
principles A-.Second, equitable treatment of shareholders (10 questions) -principles B-
.Third, rights of stakeholders in corporate governance (4 questions) -principles C-
.Fourth, disclosure & transparency  (30 questions) -principles D-.Fifth, responsibilities of 
the board of co mmissioners and board of directors (21 questions) -principles E-. Each 
question would contain a yes or no response.  Each yes response gets a score of 1 and 
each no gets a score of 0.   Each variable contain in each section is a sum of 
observation found in the annual reports and data available each company.  Based on 
the sample criteria above, only 41 companies in this research will be further analyzed. 
The method that used in this research is panel regression. The equation for the 
analyze the impact of GCG principle on firm’s protability can be written as follow: 
ROAit =  + 1 RSit + 2 ETSit + 3 ROSit + 4 DTit + 5 RBBit + it 
Where: ROA is return on asset; RS is rights of shareholders; ETS is equitable 
treatment of shareholders; ROS is role of shareholders; DT is disclosure and 
transparencies; RBB is role board of director (BOD) and board of commisioner 
(BOC). 
 Besides that, we are going to analyze the impact of five principles to Firm’s 
value, the equation can be written as follow: 
TQit =  + 1 RSit + 2 ETSit + 3 ROSit + 4 DTit + 5 RBBit+ 6 ROAit+ it 
Where: TQ is Tobin Q; RS is rights of shareholders; ETS is equitable treatment of 
shareholders; ROS is role of shareholders; DT is disclosure and transparencies; RBB is 
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role board of director (BOD) and board of commisioner (BOC). ROA is return on 
asset. 
There are three model that can be used in panel regression, such as: common 
effect model, fixed effect model, and random effect model. To find the best model 
between common effect and fixed effect, we used Chow test. For the best model 
between fixed effect and random effect, we used Hausman test. For the best model 
between common effect and random effect, we used Lagrange Multiplier test. 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Good Corporate Governance and Firm’s Profitability 
Based on the paired tests of 3 data panel regression models, as indicated in 
Table 1 can be concluded that fixed effect model in the data panel regression is 
appropriately used to further analyze 5 principles (A, B, C, D, dan E) of corporate 
governance on ROA of 41 corporations in Indeks Kompas for period 2007-2012. 
Table 1. Panel Data Regression Model Test Conclusion 
No Methods Tests Results 
1 Chow-Test Common Effect vs Fixed Effect Fixed Effect 
2 Lagrange Multiplier (LM-test). Common Effect vs Random Effect Random  Effect 
3 Hausman Test Fixed Effect vs Random Effect Fixed Effect 
Data panel regression estimate with fixed effect model proves that corporate 
governance principles, they are principles A, B, C, D, and E partially impact ROA 
performance significantly at 95 percent confidence level. For F test shows that 5 
principles of corporate governance simultaneously and significantly impact ROA 
performance. Meanwhile for the goodnes of fit test, shows that determining coefficient 
R2 of 0.9540, which means that 5 corporate governance principles can explain variation 
of ROA by 95.40 percent, while the remaining 4.60 percent can be explained by other 
factors not included in this model. 
Corporate Governance principle A with the coefficient estimator β1 = 0.4499 
impact ROA positively and significantly, where p value t-statistic (0.0009) is less than α 
= 0,01 which means that H0 is rejected. The interpretation of  β1 = 0.4499is when 
there is improvement of corporate governance A by 10 % then the ROA will increase 
by 4.50 %. This empirical finding is consistent with the research hypothesis that states 
corporate governance A positively impact the profitability performance measured by 
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ROA of 41 corporations in 41 corporations in Indeks Kompas 100 for period 2007-
2012.Corporate Governance Principle B with coefficient estimator β1 = - 1.5878 
impact the ROA negatively and significantly, where p value t-statistic (0.0046) is less 
than α = 0.05 which means H0 is rejected. The interpretation of β1 = - 1.5878 is when 
there is improvement of corporate governance principle B by 10 % then the corporate 
ROA will decrease by 15.88 percen. This empirical finding is different from the 
research hypothesis that states that corporate governance principle B positively impact 
the profitability of ROA of 41 corporations in Indeks Kompas 100 for period 2007-
2012. 
Table 2. GCG and Firm’s Profitability 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 19.71892 0.939739 20.98339 0.0000 
RS (A) 0.444989 0.182449 2.438982 0.0156 
ETS (B) -1.587838 1.056775 -3.502532 0.0046 
ROS (C) 1.533926 0.397136 3.862471 0.0002 
DT (D) -3.386388 1.095304 -3.091734 0.0023 
RBB (E) 0.562175 0.200112 2.809301 0.0055 
R-squared 0.953960  F-statistic 89.47391 
Adjusted R-squared 0.943298  Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Corporate governance principle C with coefficient estimator β1 = 1.5339 
impact the ROA performance positively and significantly where p value t-statistic 
(0.0580) is less than α = 0.10, which means that H0 is rejected. The interpretation for 
β1 = 1.5339is when there is improvement of corporate governance principle B by 10 % 
then corporate ROA will increase by 15.34 %.  This empirical finding is consistent with 
the research hypothesis that Corporate Governance C positively impact the ROA of 
41 corporations in Indeks Kompas 100 for period 2007-2012. 
Corporate Governance principle D with the coefficient estimator β1 = - 
3.38649 did not impact the ROA performance where probability value t-statistic 
(0.1210) is greater than α = 0.05, which means that H0 is don’t rejected.  This 
empirical finding is different from the research hypotesis that states corporate 
governance principle D positively and significantly impact the profitability performance 
measured by ROA of 41 corporations in Indeks Kompas 100 for period 2007-2012. 
Corporate Governance Principle E with coefficient estimator β1 = 0.5622 
impact the ROA performance positively and significantly, which means H0 is rejected. 
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Interpretation for  β1 = 0.5622 is when there is increase value from corporate 
governance principle E by 10 percent then the performance ROA will increase by 5.62 
percent.  This empirial finding is consistent with the research hypothesis that 
Corporate Governance Principle E has positive impact on the profitability measured by 
ROA of 41 corporations Indeks Kompas 100 for period 2007-2012. 
The use of fixed effect model for data panel regression can show variation in 
the constants of 41 corporations that become the samples of this research, though the 
coefficient regressor remains the same.  Fixed effect meant in this research is that each 
corporation has a constant value that remains the same for different period of time 
(time invariant).  The estimate of data panel regression data panel equation for each of 
the corporation shown in the equation 5.44 sampai 5.83. From the 41 data panel 
regression equation for each company (equation 5.44 – 5.83) can be concluded as the 
following: First, corporation that has the highest average improvement of ROA 
performance during period 2007-2012 is perusahaan PT. Gas Negara (Persero) Tbk 
(SMRA) with total Constant value [Ci + 21.9198] = 6.9869 + 19.7189 = 35.7251. 
Second, corporation that has the lowest performance of ROA for period 2007-2012 is 
Mayora Indah Tbk (MYOR) with total constant value of [Ci + 21,9198] = -8.8510 + 
19.7189 = 10.8679. 
This empirical finding in Indonesia is in line with CLSA research finding in 2002 
where higher Corporate Governance Index eventually translates to higher firms’ value. 
Managers who believe the corporations will go well will purchase stocks that can be 
the motor of increasing the value of corporations like in Japan (Morch et al, 2000), and 
other countries (Khan et al, 2009, Frakes 2007, Jiao 2010).  
Corporate Governance principle for equitable treatment of shareholders (B) 
effected ROA negatively and significantly. This can be attributed to higher cost 
associated to maintain a large number of stockholders of public companies that may 
change their ownership frequently. Corporate Governance principle for equitable 
treatment of shareholders (B) did not  have a significant effect on Tobins’Q.   This 
empirical finding is consistent with the finding of Lukviarman (2001) of corporations in 
Indonesia do not have the mechanism for addressing minority stockholders 
expectation, as the majority of the companies are owned by majority stockholders 
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who are mostly family or the government. Musnadi (2006) found that excessive 
control from majority stockholders hinder management’s creativity. 
Frakes (2007) found that the institutional ownership level in a large proportion 
would effect the value of firm positively. Based on this finding, the larger the instutional 
ownership, the more effective management performance will be.   There were three 
hypothesis for the relationship between instutional ownership and the value of firm. 
The first interpretation was the efficient monitoring hypothesis. This hypothesis 
revealed that individual investors and inside owners with low ownership of stocks 
(minority) had a tendency to lend its voting power to institutional investors to control 
the performance of management. Majority institutional investors would be on the side 
of minority stockholders when they share a common interest, particularly in obtaining 
economic incentive both in the long run (dividend) and short run (abnormal stock 
return). This action would impact on the growth of corporate value shown by the 
increase of stock price. 
The second interpretation was the strategic alignment. Different from the first 
one, this hypothesis stated that majority institutional investors had a tendency to 
compromise, or on the side of management, ignored the interest of minority 
stockholders. The assumption that the management often takes actions and makes 
policies that were less than optimal and tending to personal interest, causing the 
strategic alliance between majority institutional investors and the management, is 
negatively responded by the public. This would lead to the decrease of stock price. 
The third interpretation was the conflict of interest hypothesis. This hypotheses 
basically shared similar concept with the second hypothesis, which was majority 
institutional investor to reduce conflict by compromising and allying with the 
management.  
The three aforementioned interpretations have separated the explanations of 
positive relationship from the institutional relationship with the value of firm.  This 
separation is finally bringing a conclusion to the inconsistent relationship between 
institutional ownership with the value of firm. Mak and Kusnadi (2005) found that 
instituitional ownership did not have significant relation to the value of firm. The 
previous researches related to Principle B had no significant relationship with value of 
the firm Hypothesis 3 in Indonesia and U.S.A.   
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Corporate Governance principle of role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
(C) have positive and significant effects on ROA, which is in support of the stakeholder 
theory (Freeman, 1984 and Mitchell, et.al, 1997) that states a corporation needs to 
work, identify its stakeholders to ensure long term sustainable attainment of 
corporations goals.  This empirical finding also support Hofstede’s finding that 
Indonesia is a highly collectivist country (Widjaja, 2010) so the support of community 
is essential to achieving a win win relationship. 
Corporate  Governance  principle  responsibilities  of  the  board  of  
Commissioners  and  board  of  Directors  (E)  effect   the   profitability  performance   of 
ROA  positively  and   significantly.   This   is   consistent   with   the   findings  of 
Gisbert  and   Navallas   (2013)   for   Spanish   corporations   when   a   manager 
understands   the  principal   is   monitoring   their   activities   there  is more 
disclosure.  Ho  and  and  Wong (2001),  Eng  and  Mak   (2003)   found   that 
companies  listed  in  Hong  Kong  Stock  Exchange  have  positive  and  significant 
relation healthy ratio of non executive independent directors, block institutional 
ownership, board size  and lower director ownership on the board.  
Good Corporate Governance and Firm’s Value 
Next, we are going to analyze the impact of five GCG principles to the Tobin 
Q value. Data Panel regression model estimate with fixed effect model shows that  
principles A, B, C, D, E of Corporate Governance and ROA affect the firms’ value 
Tobin’s Q significantly at 95 percent level of confidence.  For F –test shows that the 5 
principles of corporate governance and profitability ROA significantly affect the firms’ 
value measured by  Tobin’s Q. For the goodness of fit test, shows that the determining 
coefficient R2 at 0.9332, which means that the variation of corporation valuation 
measured by Tobin’s Q can be explained by the 5 principles of corporate governance 
and profitability performance by 93.32 percent, while the rest 6.68 percent can be 
explained by other factors not included in this model. 
Principle A of Corporate Governance with the estimator coefficient β1 = 
0.3224 partially affect the firms’ value measured by Tobin’s q positively and significantly 
at 95 percent level of confidence where p value t-statistic (0.0173) is less than α = 0.05 
which means that is H0 rejected. For β1 = 0.3224explanation is when principle A from 
Corporate Governance increases by 10 pecent, then the firms’ value will go up by 
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3.224 percent. This empirical finding is consistent with the research hypothesis that 
principle A is positively affecting the firms’ value by Tobin’s q at the 41 corporations in  
Indeks Kompas 100 for period 2007-2012. 
Table 3. GCG and Firm’s Value 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 15.77765 11.19910 4.408831 0.1605 
RS (A) 0.322419 0.178117 2.810154 0.0019 
ETS (B) -0.316580 1.021175 -2.310015 0.0169 
ROS (C) 0.454706 0.390879 2.163292 0.0002 
DT (D) -1.065785 1.062951 -3.002666 0.0073 
RBB (E) 0.011338 0.193349 3.058642 0.0033 
ROA 0.294055 0.276885 2.062010 0.0096 
R-squared 0.933201  F-statistic 57.09582 
Adjusted R-squared 0.916856  Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Principle  B  from   corporate   governance   with   coefficient   estimator  β2  
= -0.3166   partially   negatively   and  significantly  affect  firms’  value   measured  by 
Tobins’Q.  This   empirical   finding   supports  the   research   hypothesis   that   
states  Principle B from Corporate   Governance   negatively   and   significantly   
affect  the firms’ value measured by Tobin’s q at 41 corporations in  Indeks   Kompas 
100   during  period  2007-2012. Principle C from corporate governance with 
coefficient   estimator β3 = 0.4546  partially   positively   and   significantly   affect  
firms’ value  measured  by Tobins’Q.  This empirical  finding   supports   the   research 
hypothesis   that   states   Principle   C   from   Corporate   Governance   positively 
affect   the   firms’  value  measured   by Tobin’s q at 41 corporations in Indeks 
Kompas 100 during period 2007-2012. 
Principle D from corporate governance with coefficient estimator β4 = -1.0658 
partially significantly and negatively influence firms’ value measured by Tobins’Q.  This 
empirical finding supports the research hypothesis that states Principle D from 
Corporate Governance negatively affect the firms’ value measured by Tobin’s q at 41 
corporations in Indeks Kompas 100 during period 2007-2012. Principle E from 
corporate governance with coefficient estimator β5 = 0.0113 significantly and positively 
partially influence firms’ value measured by Tobins’Q.  This empirical finding supports 
the research hypothesis that states Principle E from Corporate Governance positively 
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affect the firms’ value measured by Tobin’s q at 41 corporations in Indeks Kompas 100 
during period 2007-2012. 
Profitability performance measured by ROA with coefficient estimator β6 = 
0.2941 significantly and positively influence firms’ value measured by Tobins’Q.  This 
empirical finding supports the research hypothesis that states Profitability performance 
ROA positively affect firms’ value measured by Tobin’s q at 41 corporations in Indeks 
Kompas 100 during period 2007-2012.  
From the 41 fixed effect data panel regression for each corporation (equation 
5.208 – 5.247) can be concluded as the following: First, company that has the highest 
Firms’ value by Tobins’Q during the period of 2007-2012 is PT.Bumi Resource Tbk 
(BUMI) with Constant value [Ci + 89,9562] =  3,6355 + 15,7776 = 19.4131. Second, 
company that has the lowest average in Firms’ value by Tobins’Q  for the period 2007-
2012 is PT Mayora Indah Tbk (MYOR) with total constant value [Ci + 89,9562] =  -
8,6463 + 15,7776 = 7.1313. 
This empirical finding supports the research by Bebchuck et al (2004) found 
that honoring the rights of stockholders lead to higher firms’ valuation.  Stiglitz (1985) 
that states majority institutional investors provide increased ability to control the 
power of voice or representations on Board of Directors.  
Corporate Governance principle disclosure and transparency (D)negatively and 
significant impact on ROA, Tobins’ Q.  Out of the 5 principles.  This principle is the 
most influential one shown by the largest coefficient values.  This is possible due to the 
fact that many of the companies included in the sample of Indonesian Manufacturing 
firms in Kompas 100, were family business groups in Indonesia, where the family 
business patriarchs still have the final say of what is to be implemented in the 
corporations.  This unexpected finding is consistent with Tabalujan (2002) concept of 
Patrimonialism where there is a deviation between the formal law and implementation 
in Indonesia, because of the opportunistic attitude of business people (Williamson, 
1988).   This empirical finding is also similar to the findings in Hong Kong researched 
by Leung and Horwitz (2004) that concentrated ownership is correlated with low 
voluntary disclosure. In this case, the concentrated ownership is the shares owned by 
the families listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange. Secondly, IFRS were to be 
implemented in Indonesia starting from 2012.  The annual reports in this study only 
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covers the years of 2007-2012.  IFRS would require public listed companies to disclose 
sufficiently.  If more years to be included, it is likely that these companies will be more 
transparent that the samples in this research. 
Corporate Governance principle for responsibilities of the board of Commissioners 
and board of Directors (E)  positively and significantly impact on firms’ value  Tobins’Q.  
Corporate Governance Index positively and significantly affect profitability 
performance as indicated by the measurement of ROA and  the firms’ value expressed 
by Tobins’ Q. The notion that Corporate Governance Index has significant and 
positive implication with profitability ROA is consistent with the research findings of 
Brown and Caylor (2004), Mormahadi (2005).  ROA directly effect firms’ values 
significantly and positively directions.  
This is consistent with the Assymetry theory and agency theory that state there 
is an information congruence between the owners and managers who run the 
company, which may have different or even conflicting points of interests.  This 
empirical finding supports the validity of these theories in Indonesian public listed 
companies in Indeks Kompas 100 for period 2007-2012, as Lukviarman (2001) found 
that many companies do not apply Corporate Governance in Indonesia because there 
is insufficient law enforcements and supporting agencies.  
Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) documented a non-
linear relation between managerial ownership to the value of firm.  The ownership of 
firm management aligned the interest of management inside the company with the 
interests of outside stockholders, increasing value. However, up to a certain degree of 
ownership as inside managerial ownership increases the entrenchment effects (opacity) 
and of inside ownership dominates; and higher inside management ownership was 
associated with lower firm value.Bhagat et al. (2004) did not find any evidence 
supporting positive correlation between the concentrations of ownership with the 
value of firm in the stock market. His research found that Hypothesis 3 Principle D 
was not significantly affecting Firm’s value.   
Corporate Governance Index negatively and significantly affect profitability 
performance of firms’ value expressed by Tobins’ Q, is related to the fact that 
Disclosure and transparencies at Hypothesis 3.4 is significantly negatively related to 
Indonesian manufacturing firms’ value.   This finding  different from the findings from 
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Black et.al (2003) of corporations in South Korea that proved better corporate 
governance index leads to a higher corporate value and Cheung et al (2007) for 
corporations listed in Hong Kong.  We can attribute this due to the fact that IFRS had 
just been mandatorily implemented for Indonesian public companies starting 2012.  
Thus, before that time Corporate Governance in Indonesian Manufacturing firms’ who 
are predominantly family business were not implemented.This is also reflected with the 
very low coefficient of Corporate governance Index signalling the weak 
implementation of Corporate Governance in Indonesia.  
From this result, the most important principle of Corporate Governance 
influencing both the manufacturing firms’ profitability and manufacturing firms’ value is 
disclosure and transparencies, followed by equitable treatment of shareholders.  This 
means the improvement of these principles implementation in Indonesia will 
fundamentally strengthen the corporate governance implementation in Indonesia. 
Besides that, we learn that Profitability plays a more vital role in influencing the 
Indonesian manufacturing firms’ value compared to Corporate Governance Index that 
represent the cumulative implementation of corporations. 
Silveira and Barros (2007) research the quality of corporate governance in 
relation to the value of firm for 154 Brazillian companies listed in Stock Exchange in 
2002. They prepared a corporate governance index as a GCG indicator. This finding 
wass similarly shared with the research findings of Beltratti (2005); Vintila and 
Gherghina (2012); and Fallatah and Dickins (2012).  Their findings also supported that 
Hypothesis 3 & 4 had positive and significant related to firms’ value.  Black et al. (2003) 
created a corporate governance index using a survey conducted by Korean Stock 
Exchange find that firms with better corporate governance index have a higher market 
value.  Unfortunately, this survey relied on the selection of companies’ responses that 
could have bias in the data.   
Cheung et al. (2007) examine the relationship between corporate governance 
and the value of firm, listed in Hongkong, based on OECD principles of corporate 
governance and the code of best practices. They constructed a corporate governance 
index for Hongkong listed companies. The empirical evidence shows that a company’s 
value was positively related to overall corporate governance index.  This research 
summarizes that GCG is equal to value maximization.  
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Chai et al (2007) empirically proven that high quality corporations can give 
signals to the market that would lead the stock price decrease. Miglo (2007) used a 
mathematical approach using the assymetric information  theory.  Information 
separates the understanding of high earning corporations from low earning ones.  
Those that have high earnings would tend to use debt as a source of financing and 
those of low earnings will issue shares to the public.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Model 1 from this research concludes and supports the hypothesis that rights 
of shareholders significantly and positively influence ROA.  The finding also support 
that Equitable Shareholders significantly and negatively influence ROA.  The research 
concludes that Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance Significantly and 
Positively influence ROA. Disclosure and Transparency significantly and negatively 
influence ROA. Responsibilities of The board of Commissioners and Board of 
Directors significantly and positively influence ROA.  The conclusions answer both the 
research objectives and problem identification mentioned earlier. 
Model 2 findings conclude that the hypothesis that Rights of Shareholders 
positively   and  significantly   influence   Firms’  value   using   Tobins’  Q  is 
determined   by   the   stock   prices,   and   it   is  determined   by   supply   and 
demand. The model also postively and significantly influence Tobins’Q. Equitable 
Treatment  of  Shareholders   negatively   and   significantly   influence  Firm’s value 
using Tobins’Q. Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance Significantly and 
positively influence Tobins’ Q. Disclosure and Transparency  significantly  and  
negatively  influence  Tobins’Q.  Responsibilities  of Board  of  Commissioners   and   
Board  of  Directors   significantly   and   positively influence  Tobin’s Q. ROA  
positively   and   significantly   influence   Tobins’ Q.  These conclusions   answers   the   
research   questions   and  objectives   mentioned   in  the  beginning   of   the  
research. 
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